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Introduction
Recently, several criminal cases involving individuals who successfully encouraged other people to commit suicide have received prominent media attention. 1 These cases are often quite disturbing. In one
1.

Former Nurse Helped Instruct Man on How to Commit Suicide, Court Rules,
The Guardian (Dec. 28, 2015, 2:38 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/dec/28/minnesota-suicide-conviction-william-melchertdinkel-mark-drybrough [https://perma.cc/YDA3-YNSK] (discussing the
court of appeals’s “rul[ing] that there was sufficient evidence to convict
William Melchert-Dinkel . . . of assisting the 2005 death of Mark Drybrough”
after the Supreme Court of Minnesota struck down Minnesota’s statute
criminalizing encouraging suicide and remanded the case for further
proceedings); Nurse Is Accused of Using Internet to Encourage Suicides,
N.Y. Times (Oct. 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/us/
18suicides.html [https://perma.cc/CQS9-UZ26] (discussing the investigation
that eventually led to the criminal prosecution of William Melchert-Dinkel);
Kathy McCabe, Mass. Woman Must Stand Trial in Teen Friend’s Suicide,
Bos. Globe (July 1, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/
2016/07/01/sjc-rules-teen-charged-with-cajoling-friend-commit-suicide-muststand-trial/J6bZdTPL6MNIaJ4iTlNLAJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/
CD4U-9UGA] (discussing the decision by the Massachusetts Supreme
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recent case, Michelle Carter, a Massachusetts teenager, reportedly encouraged Conrad Roy, her boyfriend, to commit suicide. 2 Her text
messages and phone calls went beyond mere encouragement, however,
as Carter named specific methods by which her boyfriend could commit
suicide and encouraged him to use them. 3 In July 2014:
Carter assisted Conrad’s suicide by counseling him to overcome
his doubts, devising a plan to run a combustion engine within his
truck in order to poison him with carbon monoxide, and . . .
direct[ed] him to go back in his truck after he exited it, when he
became frightened that the plan was working. 4

Carter also told her boyfriend that he would be her “beautiful guardian
angel forever and ever (smiley face)” and that she would “always smile
up at [him] knowing that [he wasn’t] far away.” 5
Similarly, a Minnesota man responded to postings on several suicide
websites while “[p]osing as a depressed and suicidal young female
nurse.” 6 While posting online, William Melchert-Dinkel contacted several suicidal individuals and “feigned caring and understanding to win
the trust of the victims while encouraging each to hang themselves,
Judicial Court permitting Michelle Carter’s trial to go forward); Simon
McCormack, Teen Faces Charges for Encouraging Friend to Commit
Suicide: Cops, Huffington Post (Feb. 27, 2015, 4:51 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/27/teen-encouraged-friend-to-commitsuicide_n_6771964.html [https://perma.cc/B5RF-5JM5] (discussing the
charges filed against Michelle Carter); Abby Phillip, ‘Get Back In’: Teen
Charged with Pressuring Boyfriend to Commit Suicide, Wash. Post (Mar.
2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/
03/02/get-back-in-there-teen-charged-with-pressuring-boyfriend-to-commitsuicide/ [https://perma.cc/NM4B-YQAY] (describing the events leading to
the suicide in Commonwealth v. Carter).
2.

Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Commonwealth
v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (New Bedford Juv. Ct. Aug. 21, 2015), http://
www.wcvb.com/blob/view/-/34888334/data/1/-/3mh04m/-/MichelleCarter
CourtDocs082415.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6F3-U64D]. Many of the documents
in Commonwealth v. Carter are not available online, as the case is in juvenile
court.

3.

Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment at 2, Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (New Bedford
Juv. Ct. Sept. 22, 2015) (“Phone records revealed that the victim and
defendant also spoke by phone to each other during the time it is believed the
victim sat in his truck inhaling the carbon monoxide fumes. At some point,
the defendant told the victim to ‘get back in his truck’ when he exited because
he was ‘scared that it was working.’”).

4.

Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2,
at 1.

5.

Id. at 2.

6.

State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Minn. 2014).
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falsely claiming that he would also commit suicide.” 7 Melchert-Dinkel
also “attempt[ed] to persuade them to let him watch the hangings via
webcam.” 8 Melchert-Dinkel successfully encouraged at least two people
to commit suicide throughout the course of his postings online. 9
Unlike physician-assisted suicide, which has received a significant
amount of legal and academic attention, encouraging suicide has received far less news coverage. 10 Currently, encouraging suicide is not
specifically prohibited in many jurisdictions, and jurisdictions that do
specifically prohibit it do so through statutes of dubious constitutionality, likely due to the issue’s relative obscurity. 11 Many people want
this sort of behavior to be illegal, 12 and there are currently a number of

7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Id. at 16–17 (describing the facts behind the two suicides that MelchertDinkel successfully encouraged).

10.

For a thorough discussion about the legal issues behind physician-assisted
suicide, see Margaret P. Battin, Physician-Assisted Dying and the Slippery
Slope: The Challenge of Empirical Evidence, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 91
(2008) (discussing the competing policy rationales behind legalizing physicianassisted suicide and behind outlawing or heavily regulating it); Katherine A.
Chamberlain, Note, Looking for a “Good Death”: The Elderly Terminally
Ill’s Right to Die by Physician-Assisted Suicide, 17 Elder L.J. 61, 62 (2009)
(arguing for a “constitutional right to choose physician-assisted suicide as a
way to end [someone’s life]”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
(upholding Washington’s ban on assisted suicide as rationally related to a
legitimate government interest). In fact, encouraging suicide has occasionally
been considered alongside assisted suicide or aiding a suicide attempt with
material support. See Donald W. Grieshober, Comment, SUICIDE—Criminal
Aspects, 1 Vill. L. Rev. 316, 321 (1956) (considering encouraging suicide
along with material support arguably constituting assisting suicide).

11.

See infra Part III.B (discussing the constitutional issues underlying current
statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide).

12.

See Kayleigh Green, There Should Be No Defense for Encouraging Suicide,
Collegiate Times (Sept. 6, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.collegiatetimes
.com/opinion/there-should-be-no-defense-for-encouraging-suicide/article_12b
82a38-5294-11e5-b0e0-f359f4e7cf07.html [https://perma.cc/9P7J-VF4Q]
(portraying Michelle Carter as “a young sociopath . . . [who hid] behind her
right of speech in order to bully one of the people who trusted her the most
while he was in a dark place”); Stephanie Slifer, Is It a Crime to “Encourage
Suicide”? Teens’ Texts Under Scrutiny, CBS News (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:00 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-it-a-crime-to-encourage-suicide-unusualmassachusetts-case-of-conrad-roy-and-michelle-carter/ [https://perma.cc/
EJL6-TDCH] (“People shouldn’t manipulate and coerce mentally vulnerable
victims. There should be some way that society punishes this behavior.”);
#JusticeForConrad Hashtag Surfaces After Texts Appear to Show Teen
Urging Boyfriend to Kill Himself, WTVR (Aug. 30, 2015, 3:33 PM),
http://wtvr.com/2015/08/30/michelle-carter-justiceforconrad-hashtagsurfaces-after-messages-appear-to-show-teen-urging-boyfriend-to-kill-himself/
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methods to charge someone for encouraging another to commit
suicide. 13 Most of these options, however, have significant drawbacks.
Encouraging suicide cases present extremely emotional issues and a
very legitimate question of whether the victim would still be alive but
for the encourager’s actions. Indeed, encouraging someone to commit
suicide can be fatal. 14 These cases often involve people taking advantage
of victims who are mentally unstable and susceptible to encouragement
to commit suicide. 15 Nevertheless, it is unclear whether encouraging suicide is actually illegal in many jurisdictions. Solving this problem will
likely prove difficult, as any legislative solution intended to address the
full scope of the problem will encounter potentially fatal problems. 16
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of attitudes towards
suicide in Western civilization and notes that, while society’s attitudes
towards suicide have changed slightly over time, most still condemn
suicide as a practice. Although the act of suicide itself is no longer
punished directly, it is still strongly discouraged, as evidenced by continuing suicide prevention efforts and broad criminalization of
physician-assisted suicide—although legalization efforts have made
some progress. 17 Part II of this Note attempts to define the concept of
encouraging suicide and suggests that a bright line demarcating encouraging suicide from other forms of conduct simply does not exist.
Part III describes the various types of prosecutions for encouraging
suicide that are currently available to prosecutors, including involuntary manslaughter, prosecutions under specific statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide, alternatively prosecuting encouraging suicide as
assisting suicide, and prosecuting under a theory of incitement to
commit a crime. Finally, Part IV notes that no current type of prosecution described in Part III passes muster and proposes crafting a
new statute to prohibit encouraging suicide directly. Part IV further
discusses problems with crafting specific legislation and discusses how
[https://perma.cc/H6PU-NKUN] (noting the viral spread of the hashtag
#JusticeForConrad in the wake of Conrad Roy’s suicide).
13.

See infra Part III.

14.

R.B. Brandt, The Morality and Rationality of Suicide, in A Handbook for
the Study of Suicide 61, 74 (Seymour Perlin ed., 1975) (“It is often
important to one who is contemplating suicide to go over his thinking with
another, and to feel that a conclusion, one way or the other, has the support
of a respected mind.”).

15.

See infra notes 68–70 (describing how the victim in Commonwealth v. Carter
may have been susceptible to Michelle Carter encouraging him to commit
suicide).

16.

See infra Part IV (discussing obstacles facing new legislation in this area).

17.

For more information about efforts to legalize physician-assisted suicide, see
infra note 33.
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best to balance the competing policy interests of discouraging suicide
and protecting free speech.

I.

Suicide in Western Culture

Throughout Western civilization, suicide has been widely condemned as a practice. 18 Much of the condemnation of suicide has religious roots, as “Christianity since the time of Augustine has declared
suicide a violation of the divine injunction against killing.” 19 However,
“[n]either the Hebrew Bible nor the New Testament prohibits suicide.” 20
Although the Bible itself does contain several instances of suicide, the
most prominent Biblical suicides were not done out of despair, but were
instead done to achieve some sort of purpose. 21 Nevertheless, it is clear

18.

Irwin N. Perr, Legal Aspects of Suicide, in Suicide: Theory and Clinical
Aspects 91, 91 (L.D. Hankoff & Bernice Einsidler eds., 1979) (noting that
Blackstone “considered suicide to be a double crime—against both the king
and God”); Georges Minois, History of Suicide: Voluntary Death
in Western Culture 3 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1999) (“Society has
never been indifferent to [suicide]. On rare occasions acclaimed as an act of
heroism, suicide has more often been subject to social reprobation because it
was considered an insult to God, who gave us life, and to society, which
provides for the well-being of its members.”); id. at 7–9 (listing a number of
historical suicides, the reasons for them, and for some, their punishment).

19.

John Moskop & H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Ethics of Suicide: A
Secular View, in Suicide: Theory and Clinical Aspects, supra note 18,
at 49. For descriptions of the religious rationale condemning suicide, see
Minois, supra note 18, at 3 (“If we exist, it is because we must exist in order
to glorify God and to make ourselves useful in society.”); id. at 72 (“Martin
Luther considered suicide to be a murder committed by the devil . . . .”); id.
at 73 (“In England, Anglicans and Puritans diabolized suicide . . . .”); id. at
55 (“The absolute prohibition on taking one’s own life became firmly
established in the Roman Empire under barbarian rule. Formalized by the
scholastics during the Middle Ages, prohibition eventually became an integral
part of the basic structures of Christian thought.”); Ronald W. Maris,
Alan L. Berman & Morton M. Silverman, Comprehensive Textbook
of Suicidology 480 (2000) (“St. Augustine . . . vigorously expressed
Christianity’s unequivocal rejection of suicide as a violation of the sixth
commandment: ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ Suicide was a mortal sin, the consequence of which was hell, not heaven.”).

20.

George Rosen, History, in A Handbook for the Study of Suicide,
supra note 14, at 3, 4.

21.

See id. (“There are only five instances [of suicide] reported in the Hebrew
Bible and one in the New Testament.”); L.D. Hankoff, Judaic Origins of the
Suicide Prohibition, in Suicide: Theory and Clinical Aspects, supra
note 18, at 3, 5–7 (listing Biblical references to suicide, as well as noting their
similarities, including that all “offered the reader an understandable explanation for the self-destruction,” that “[a]ll were males in a state of physical
stress or apt to be in mortal danger very shortly,” and that “[a]ll but one . . .
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that “the religious ban on suicide has remained unquestioned throughout religious history.” 22
In addition to being widely condemned as a practice from a religious
perspective, suicide has historically been subject to steep legal penalties. 23 In the Middle Ages, suicide could be punished with a shameful
burial “at the crossroads with a stake through the heart” instead of in
a cemetery with traditional religious rites. 24 Suicide was considered “a
felo de se, a ‘felony against the self’” and someone who committed
suicide could “forfeit[] his goods to the state,” harming the family he or
she left behind. 25 The United States has only decriminalized suicide in
the past hundred years, as suicide was held to be an indictable offense
as late as 1937. 26 In the past, several states “have held suicide to be a
crime but not punishable if accomplished.” 27
In time, society has grown to recognize that suicide has many causes
and has gradually eliminated the severe legal and religious punishments
attached to it. 28 Society has instead decided to deal with the issue of
were prominent people whose positions of leadership were seriously damaged
or threatened”).
22.

Hankoff, supra note 21, at 20. However, “acts of suicide, particularly
martyrdoms, have occurred and been adjudged religiously acceptable.” Id.

23.

See Maris et al., supra note 19, at 481 (“The state soon echoed these
arguments by providing civil mandates against suicide.”).

24.

Id. “In 1824 burial in the highway was ended in England by a parliamentary
act,” but burials for suicide were still not afforded religious ceremonies. Perr,
supra note 18, at 92.

25.

Maris et al., supra note 19, at 481. A suicide caused by “madness,
transient insanity, or young age” did not necessarily trigger the punishments
regularly attached to suicide, however. Id.

26.

Perr, supra note 18, at 92–93 (listing two New Jersey cases considering
suicide to be “a criminal offense committed in the lifetime of the offender”
and “an indictable offense,” as well as noting that “possible prosecution for
attempted suicide” was only eliminated in New Jersey by statute in 1972).
But see id. at 92 (“New York considered suicide a ‘grave public wrong’ but
not a crime. Illinois stated it ‘had never regarded the English laws as to
suicide as applicable to the spirit of our institutions.’”) (citation omitted);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17.1 (2015) (abolishing the common-law crime of
suicide in North Carolina in 1973).

27.

Perr, supra note 18, at 92. The states were Alabama, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, and South Carolina. Id.

28.

In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Cal. 1983) (“Currently no state,
including California, has a statute making a successful suicide a crime, nor
does the Model Penal Code recognize suicide as a crime.”); see Maris et
al., supra note 19, at 481 (discussing the gradual elimination of legal
punishments associated with suicide); Catherine D. Shaffer, Note, Criminal
Liability for Assisting Suicide, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 348, 350 (1986) (“A
survey of the criminal codes of the fifty states and three United States
territories reveals that no jurisdiction defines suicide, by statute, as a
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suicide in a more rehabilitative manner, with a large variety of resources
available to help anyone who is at risk of suicide. 29 For instance, courts
have held that prisoners are entitled to mental health treatment and
protection from suicide attempts while in prison. 30
Nevertheless, the condemnation and stigma attached to suicide
have not abated, and society still wants to discourage suicide as an act
that has significant negative moral implications. 31 Even though the legal
punishments have gradually been eliminated, suicide can still have

criminal act. Nor does any state, by statute, criminalize attempts to commit
suicide.”) (citation omitted).
29.

In the wake of the media coverage of Robin Williams’s suicide, internet views
of suicide prevention materials increased significantly, as did calls to suicide
prevention hotlines. Liz Szabo, Calls to Crisis Hotlines Surge After Williams’
Suicide, USA Today (Aug. 15, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.usatoday
.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/suicide-hotline-calls-surge/14053415/
[https://perma.cc/32JF-CK6P]. Furthermore, states such as West Virginia
have enacted statutes requiring schools and universities “to offer suicide
awareness and prevention programs to their students.” WVU Implements
‘Jamie’s Law’ to Increase Suicide Prevention Awareness, W. Va. U. (Aug.
25, 2015), http://wvutoday.wvu.edu/n/2015/08/25/wvu-implements-jamies-law-to-increase-suicide-prevention-awareness [https://perma.cc/MWR9S9KT]. Today, a number of resources exist that are designed to help people
who are considering suicide. See Am. Found. for Suicide Prevention,
http://afsp.org/ [https://perma.cc/5NTB-4GJ3] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016)
(providing support and resources to individuals considering suicide and those
who are concerned about another’s well-being, as well as raising money for
suicide prevention); Lifeline Crisis Chat, Nat’l Suicide Prevention
Lifeline, http://suicidepreventionlifeline.com/ [https://perma.cc/EZ3R7VAD] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (hosting a hotline for individuals considering suicide to get the support that they need); Veterans Crisis Line,
https://www.veteranscrisisline.net/ [https://perma.cc/XY99-W3JV] (last
visited Mar. 9, 2016) (providing a suicide hotline targeted at veterans and
people concerned about veterans); Lifeline Crisis Chat, http://www.
crisischat.org/ [https://perma.cc/J2KH-GTU3] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016)
(providing an online chat service directed towards suicide prevention);
Crisis Text Line, http://www.crisistextline.org/ [https://perma.cc/5YVEVSJ8] (last visited Mar. 9, 2016) (providing a suicide prevention hotline in
the form of a text messaging service).

30.

See Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev., Jailhouse Lawyer’s Manual 814–15
(10th ed. 2011), http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/jlm/viewprevioused/ [https:
//perma.cc/Y48L-7QS5] (last visited Oct. 30, 2016) (“One application of the
right to mental health care is the right to protection from self-harm and
suicide.”); see also Elliott v. Cheshire Cty., 940 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that prison officials can be held liable for failing to provide mental
health treatment to prevent a prisoner’s suicide under a deliberate indifference standard).

31.

See Maris et al., supra note 19, at 481 (“Surviving family members continue to feel stigmatized by suicide, sometimes pressuring coroners to change
determinations to protect the family from a feared social condemnation.”).
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significant emotional and financial impacts on the surviving family. 32 In
addition, as suicide is still widely—but not universally—condemned,
many states criminalize conduct by third parties that could lead to
suicide, most notably assisted suicide. 33 Recently, the social condemnation of suicide has manifested as prosecutions for encouraging suicide.

II. Encouraging Suicide Defined
Specifically defining the concept of encouraging suicide is not a
simple task. It is both difficult and fact-intensive to find the line between relatively innocent conduct that society does not want to punish
and encouraging suicide, which—as evidenced by the recent trend in
criminal prosecutions—society does want to punish. The boundaries
between general advocacy for the right to suicide, encouraging suicide,
and assisting suicide are extremely blurred, and conduct often does not
fit neatly into just one category. Mere advocacy for the right to commit
suicide is not something that society generally seeks to punish. Occasionally, some speech can look quite a bit like encouraging or assisting
suicide, which are controversial, if not widely condemned, practices. For
example, Derek Humphry, the author of the controversial suicide instruction manual Final Exit, “was once accused by an angry young
woman of causing the suicide death of her college roommate, who was
found dead with an open copy of Final Exit in her lap.” 34 Although
there is no evidence that Humphry came into direct contact with the
32.

Perr, supra note 18, at 101 (“The law no longer punishes those who kill themselves or attempt to do so, although vestiges of that tradition remain.”);
Maris et al., supra note 19, at 481 (noting that life insurance policies
“usually contain clauses excluding benefits for death due to suicide within 1
or 2 years of the date the application was made”).

33.

Assisted suicide is illegal in most states, but several states have passed
legislation permitting physician-assisted suicide. Take Action: Death with
Dignity Around the U.S., Death with Dignity, https://www.
deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ [https://perma.cc/2T89-AKD4] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2016) (noting that five states—California, Colorado, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington (as well as the District of Columbia)—have
statutes legalizing physician-assisted suicide, a number of others are
considering legalizing the practice, and one state—Montana—has legalized
physician-assisted suicide by a court decision); Lisa Aliferis, California to
Permit Medically Assisted Suicide as of June 9, NPR, (Mar. 10, 2016, 6:58
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/10/469970753/
californias-law-on-medically-assisted-suicide-to-take-effect-june-9 [https://
perma.cc/5PYW-MAWQ] (noting that the California statute legalizing
physician-assisted suicide went into effect on June 9, 2016). For a number of
resources discussing legal issues surrounding physician-assisted suicide, see
supra note 10.

34.

Maris et al., supra note 19, at 456; see infra text accompanying notes
35–44 (discussing Final Exit and the specific instructions it gives on how to
go about committing suicide).

948

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
Deadly Speech

roommate, it is easy to see why the young woman might lay some blame
at Humphry’s feet.
Final Exit is a 1991 New York Times bestseller that “advis[es] terminally ill people how to commit suicide.” 35 The book describes when a
person might consider suicide, 36 how to find a doctor to assist in the
suicide, 37 and even explains—in great detail—several ways in which
someone might commit suicide without a doctor, including asphyxiation
in an automobile, 38 suffocation with a plastic bag, 39 and the inhalation
of inert gases, such as helium. 40 As the book includes a number of careful
statements advising readers to consult with others before deciding on
suicide, it is certainly debatable whether Final Exit actually encourages
anyone to commit suicide. 41 While “some mental-health experts warned
that an explosion of suicides” would follow the publication of Final Exit,
this did not appear to be the case. 42 For instance, one study examining
the impact of Final Exit on suicides in New York City found that the
overall suicide rate in New York City in the year after the book was
published did not change. 43 Instead, it appears that the publication of
Final Exit may have merely influenced the method by which people
35.

Lawrence K. Altman, How-to Book on Suicide Is atop Best-Seller List, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 9, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/09/us/how-tobook-on-suicide-is-atop-best-seller-list.html [https://perma.cc/2EUS-S9HW].
The book issues a disclaimer to potential users advising them of the intended
audience: “If you are thinking of ending your life because you are depressed,
or cannot cope with the pressures of this difficult world, do not use this book.
It is for dying individuals who need such information and will find it a great
solace. I ask people with suicidal thoughts to share them with family or
friends and if this does not help to call one of the hot lines or help lines listed
in their local telephone book. Please respect the true intentions of Final Exit:
the right of a terminally ill person with unbearable suffering to know how to
choose to die.” Derek Humphry, Final Exit: The Practicalities of
Self-Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying xxix (3d ed.
2002).

36.

Humphry, supra note 35, at 1.

37.

Id. at 9–14.

38.

Id. at 121–23.

39.

Id. at 124–29.

40.

Id. at 130–40. This section also includes a diagram illustrating how to use
this method properly to commit suicide. Id. at 134.

41.

See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing Final Exit’s disclaimer).

42.

Sandra G. Boodman, Book Didn’t Push Up Number of Suicides, Study Finds,
Sun Sentinel (Dec. 9, 1993), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1993-1209/lifestyle/9312080665_1_suicide-rate-final-exit-suicide-method [https://
perma.cc/2RW6-N4DP].

43.

Peter M. Marzuk et al., Increase in Suicide by Asphyxiation in New York
City After the Publication of Final Exit, 329 New Eng. J. Med. 1508, 1510
(1993).
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chose suicide, as “the number of asphyxiations by plastic bag increased
from 8 to 33,” an increase of 313%. 44 Nevertheless, the contents of Final
Exit differ substantially from the events at issue in Commonwealth v.
Carter and State v. Melchert-Dinkel, and however distasteful the book
might be, it would be a significant stretch to classify it as encouraging
suicide.
It is also important to distinguish encouraging suicide from other
behaviors that can lead to suicide. Bullying, whether online or in person, can sometimes lead to suicide. 45 This sort of behavior, while reprehensible, is often significantly different from what this Note contemplates as encouraging suicide, and should be treated that way. People
have been criminally charged for bullying that leads to suicide on
grounds other than encouraging suicide in the past. 46 Encouraging
suicide can arise in any number of contexts outside of bullying, and as
a result, it should be examined independently, even though bullying
and encouraging suicide may sometimes occur at the same time. 47
44.

Id. at 1509. The study notes that suffocation “is one of the most lethal
means” of suicide and that “[f]rom this study, we cannot determine whether
Final Exit persuaded people already intent on suicide to use different lethal
methods or induced some people who were only marginally suicidal to
commit a fatal self-destructive act. Our data are compatible with both
hypotheses.” Id. at 1510.

45.

For examples of how bullying can lead someone to contemplate and commit
suicide, see Jeff Dunn, The Time a Child Made Me Contemplate Suicide
Over Xbox Live, Unwinnable (May 21, 2012), http://www.unwinnable.
com/2012/05/21/contemplating-suicide-over-xbox-live/ [https://perma.cc/
9MYP-FRYB]; Megan Pospychala, Teen Kills Himself After Being Bullied,
Heartbroken Mother Pleads “Don’t Let Anyone Be Treated Like My Son,”
FOX6 (May 28, 2015, 8:16 PM), http://fox6now.com/2015/05/28/teenkills-himself-after-being-bullied-heartbroken-mother-pleads-dont-let-anyonebe-treated-like-my-son/ [https://perma.cc/3BSM-JTWA].

46.

Kayla Webley, Teens Who Admitted to Bullying Phoebe Prince Sentenced,
Time (May 5, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/05/05/teens-whoadmitted-to-bullying-phoebe-prince-sentenced/ [https://perma.cc/4BTDRV93] (observing that teenagers who had bullied a girl to the point that she
committed suicide were initially charged with a variety of crimes, including
criminal harassment, stalking, and felony civil rights violations); Kari Huus,
Bullied Girl’s Suicide Has Ongoing Impact, NBC News (Dec. 28, 2011, 5:50
PM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/12/28/9781587-bullied-girlssuicide-has-ongoing-impact [https://perma.cc/YU7E-YFG3] (noting that
Phoebe Prince’s suicide helped motivate lawmakers to pass broad antibullying legislation in Massachusetts).

47.

See Pospychala, supra note 45 (“One day, one of Daniel’s bullies sent him a
text saying, ‘Why don’t you take one of your precious guns and do the world
a favor and go kill yourself.’ [When Daniel said that he was going to commit
suicide, the bully said] ‘put up or shut up.’”). For more discussion of why
bullying and encouraging suicide should be addressed separately, see infra
notes 187–190.
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In addition, conduct that begins as encouraging suicide can gradually start to look quite a bit like assisting a suicide, complicating the
definition of encouraging suicide even more. For example, in
Commonwealth v. Carter, what started as Michelle Carter encouraging
her boyfriend to commit suicide gradually became what could be considered assisting suicide, including giving him specific advice on how to
carry out the suicide, such as “advice on the plan’s technical aspects.”48
Carter gave significant advice and counsel regarding carbon monoxide
poisoning and the most efficient ways to go about committing suicide
in that manner, including advice on using various generators. 49 Similarly, in State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the online conversations between
Melchert-Dinkel and the several suicidal people he spoke with contained
more than mere encouragement to commit suicide. 50 Melchert-Dinkel
also asked to watch their suicides on webcam and provided advice about
committing suicide. 51 In both cases, what began as encouragement
became something appearing to be far more substantial in nature.
For the purposes of this Note, I will limit my definition of encouraging suicide to written or verbal statements intended to coax or inspire
another to commit suicide, however forceful the statements may be.52
This Note will address both general encouragement—encouraging a
person to commit suicide in general terms and not suggesting anything
specific, such as the method or time—and specific encouragement—
encouraging a person to commit suicide in a specific time, place, or
manner. Specific encouragement can often border on aiding or assisting
suicide, and is particularly problematic as it is far more concrete than
general encouragement and helps to provide a means to the suicidal
person’s contemplated ends. 53 It is important to note that the facts

48.

Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2,
at 6. See also id. at 1–17 (providing a substantial record of text messages
between Michelle Carter and Conrad Roy).

49.

Id. at 6–11.

50.

See State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Minn. 2014) (discussing
the contents of Melchert-Dinkel’s conversations with the two individuals who
committed suicide after talking to him).

51.

Id. (“Drybrough described practicing the hanging method Melchert-Dinkel
taught him . . . .”).

52.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota used a similar definition of encouraging
suicide in State v. Melchert-Dinkel. As the Minnesota statute at issue did
not define encouraging suicide, the court used the ordinary meaning of
encourage—“to ‘[g]ive courage, confidence, or hope.’” Id. at 23.

53.

Specific encouragement may also turn encouraging suicide into something
more akin to assisted suicide. See infra Part III.C (discussing the possibility
of prosecuting for encouraging suicide under existing statutes prohibiting
aiding or assisting suicide).
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available in some cases suggest that encouraging suicide, whether generally or—more frequently—specifically, may permit prosecutions for
aiding or assisting suicide. 54 Nevertheless, not all instances of encouraging suicide can realistically be punished, as the current patchwork of
legislation criminalizing encouraging suicide is imperfect. 55

III. Types of Prosecutions for Encouraging Suicide
While some states have similarly worded statutes prohibiting
“aid[ing], or advis[ing], or encourag[ing] another to commit suicide,”
many states have significantly different legal frameworks surrounding
suicide. 56 As a result, prosecutors pursuing charges for encouraging
suicide currently have a variety of options available to them, depending
on their jurisdiction. None of these options are ideal, however, and
many have potentially fatal flaws preventing them from being effectively or reliably used to prosecute for encouraging suicide. 57
A.

Involuntary Manslaughter

One way to pursue criminal charges for encouraging suicide is to
charge defendants with involuntary manslaughter, as in the case of
Commonwealth v. Carter. 58 Since Massachusetts does not have a
specific statute prohibiting encouraging suicide, the prosecutors in this
case chose to charge Michelle Carter with involuntary manslaughter.59
54.

Prosecutions under these sets of facts will be discussed more fully in Part
III.C.

55.

The current legality of encouraging suicide is very much in question, and it
is prosecuted under a patchwork of legal frameworks. See infra Part III
(discussing how encouraging suicide is currently prosecuted). In order for a
statute to constitutionally limit speech and criminalize encouraging suicide,
it must pass strict scrutiny, and that requires narrowly tailoring the statute,
limiting its reach. See infra Part IV (discussing limitations that must be
put on a statute prohibiting encouraging suicide in order to pass constitutional muster).

56.

Cal. Penal Code § 401 (West 2016); see also infra note 85 (listing several
other state statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide).

57.

For an example of a legal theory that is completely unavailable to prosecutors, see infra Part III.D (discussing prosecuting encouraging suicide
under a theory of incitement to commit a crime).

58.

See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Commonwealth v.
Carter in greater detail); Memorandum of Decision and Order on
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, supra note 3, at 7 (denying the
defense motion to dismiss the indictment).

59.

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Commonwealth v. Carter, No. 15YO0001NE (New Bedford Juv. Ct. Aug. 10,
2015); see also Slifer, supra note 12 (“It’s not cyberbullying, it’s not
harassment, it’s not stalking. So the prosecutor says, ‘This is reprehensible
conduct, disgusting conduct, must-be-punished conduct,’ so he goes forward
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Under Massachusetts common law, “[i]nvoluntary manslaughter is ‘an
unlawful homicide unintentionally caused by an act which constitutes
such a disregard of probable harmful consequences to another as to
amount to wanton or reckless conduct.’” 60 Wanton or reckless conduct
may be established “by either the commission of an intentional act or
an ‘omission where there is a duty to act.’” 61 The elements of
involuntary manslaughter based on an intentional act are: “[(1) t]he
defendant caused the victim’s death; [(2) t]he defendant intended the
conduct that caused the victim’s death; [(3) t]he defendant’s conduct
was wanton and reckless.” 62 When involuntary manslaughter is based
on a failure to act, the elements are:
1. [t]here was a special relationship between the defendant and
the victim that gave rise to a duty of care, or the defendant
created a situation that posed a grave risk of death or serious
injury to another; 2. [t]he defendant’s failure to act caused the
victim’s death; 3. [t]he defendant intentionally failed to act; 4.
[t]he defendant’s failure to act was wanton and reckless. 63

The prosecution in Commonwealth v. Carter is pursuing involuntary
manslaughter under both of these common law theories. 64

and says, ‘Let’s call this involuntary manslaughter.’ Does it neatly fit in that
definition? Not so much.”); see also infra Part III.B and Part III.C (discussing
alternative methods of prosecution available when specific provisions criminalizing either encouraging suicide or aiding or assisting suicide are available).
60.

Commonwealth v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 442 (Mass. 1977) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Vanderpool, 328 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Mass. 1975)) (In
Massachusetts, “[t]here is no statutory definition of manslaughter,” so “[t]he
elements of the crime are derived from the common law.”); see also Model
Penal Code § 210.3 (Am. Law Inst., Official Draft 1985) (“Criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (a) it is committed recklessly; or
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”).

61.

Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 685 (Mass. 2012) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass.
1944)).

62.

Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment, supra note 3, at 3.

63.

Id.; see also Model Penal Code § 210.3 (setting forth the Model Penal
Code’s definition of manslaughter, which differs from the common law
definition of manslaughter in Massachusetts).

64.

Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note
2, at 24–37.
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Under any theory of involuntary manslaughter, however, the main
problem facing prosecutions for encouraging suicide is causation.
“[P]roximate cause is a cause which in the natural and continuous sequence produces the death and without which the death would not have
occurred.” 65 Simply put, it is not always clear whether or not the victim’s final decision to commit suicide and the act itself is actually the
result of the encouragement to commit suicide. For instance, according
to the prosecution in Commonwealth v. Carter, the main argument for
why Michelle Carter caused Conrad Roy’s death is summarized as
follows:
[W]ithout Carter’s encouragement, Conrad would not have
committed suicide. Her counsel convinced him to move past his
doubts about the plan, his reservations that his death would harm
his loved ones, and that additional time for reflection would not
improve his situation . . . . Carter led Conrad to procure a
combustion engine, which produced carbon monoxide. She then
suggested that he drive to a parking lot during the day and run
that engine within his truck. When Conrad followed this advice,
became afraid that it was working, and removed himself to a safe
area, she told him to get back in the truck and finish the job. 66

The defense, however, contests the idea of causation, arguing that
“at no time did the defendant ‘create’ a situation that posed a grave
risk of death or injury to the defendant [sic—probably decedent].” 67 The
defense alleges that “the decedent desired to take his own life and, that
prior to even meeting the defendant, had previously attempted suicide
and had been hospitalized and received mental health treatment on
several different occasions.” 68 According to the defense, these suicidal
65.

Commonwealth v. Askew, 536 N.E.2d 341, 343 (Mass. 1989) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rhoades, 401 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Mass. 1980)); see also
Paul H. Robinson, The Model Penal Code’s Conceptual Error on the Nature
of Proximate Cause, and How to Fix It, 51 Crim. L. Bull. 1311, 1312 (2015)
(“In the classic example used to illustrate [proximate cause], the defendant
shoots at the victim but misses, the victim flees, and twenty blocks later is
killed when a piano being hoisted to an upper window falls on him. The
victim would not have been killed but for the defendant’s earlier conduct in
shooting at him, which sent him running to the spot where the falling piano
would hit, but all agree that the strength of the causal connection is too
weak to be a basis for the defendant’s causal accountability for the death.”).

66.

Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2,
at 34–35.

67.

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 59,
at 9.

68.

Id. At least some form of a preexisting desire to commit suicide appears to be
common in cases involving encouraging suicide. For instance, in State v.
Melchert-Dinkel, the defendant “[p]os[ed] as a depressed and suicidal young
female nurse . . . respond[ing] to posts on suicide websites” where the first of
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impulses persisted and did not go away. 69 In addition, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that Conrad Roy “had been
receiving treatment for mental health issues since 2011” and “attempted
to commit suicide by overdosing on acetaminophen” in 2013.70 Newly
discovered evidence also indicates that Roy was prescribed medication
that “may cause suicidal thoughts in some young people.” 71
Most importantly, the defense argues that Conrad Roy made the
decision to commit suicide “on his own.” 72 Conrad Roy “alone drove to
the parking lot, brought the portable generator, and then ran the
generator while inside his vehicle that ultimately led to his death by
inhalation of carbon monoxide.” 73 In addition, the timeline surrounding
Conrad Roy’s death is unclear, and newly discovered evidence suggests
that more than eight hours may have passed between his suicide and
his last contact with Michelle Carter. 74 This raises significant causation
his eventual victims described his “life [as] so miserable he wanted to end it”
and where the second was “asking for advice on suicide methods.” State v.
Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Minn. 2014).
69.

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 59,
at 9–12.

70.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1057 (Mass. 2016).

71.

David Linton, Suicide Texting Trial of Plainville Woman Further Delayed,
Sun Chron. (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.thesunchronicle.com/news/local_
news/suicide-texting-trial-of-plainville-woman-further-delayed/article_
50d189e4-ea47-11e6-a5c8-936c7afc23d3.html [https://perma.cc/Z4YC-636H]
(noting that both Carter and Roy were prescribed Celexa, a drug that can
cause suicidal thoughts as a side effect).

72.

Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 59,
at 11 (emphasis omitted) (“Unnamed Party: ‘So what are you gonna do
then? Keep being all talk and no action and everyday go thru saing [sic] how
badly you wanna kill yourself? Or are you gonna try to get better?’ Conrad
Roy: ‘I can’t get better I already made my decision.’”). Michelle Carter and
Conrad Roy spoke in a follow-up conversation about a week later: “Conrad
Roy: ‘if you were in my position. honestly what would you do.’ Michelle
Carter: ‘I would get help. That’s just me tho. When I have a serious problem
like that, my first instinct is to get help because I know I can’t do it on my
own[.]’ Conrad Roy: ‘Well it’s too late I already gave up[.]’” Id.

73.

Id. at 14.

74.

See Curt Brown, Defense: New Information in Michelle Carter Case Raises
Possible Questions about Timeline, SouthCoastToday (Jan. 23, 2017, 7:33
PM), http://www.southcoasttoday.com/news/20170123/defense-newinformation-in-michelle-carter-case-raises-possible-questions-about-timeline
[https://perma.cc/3EF9-LZXA] (stating that police did not see Conrad
Roy’s pickup truck in the parking lot when they drove through more than
eight hours after Roy’s last contact with Michelle Carter). The case is still
ongoing, and as a result of this newly discovered evidence, the trial date is
scheduled for after the publication of this Note. Curt Brown, Judge Moves
Trial Date to June 5 in Michelle Carter Case, SouthCoastToday (Feb. 3,
2017, 8:49 PM), http://www.southcoasttoday.com/news/20170203/judge-
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issues, as Conrad Roy “might have driven around and contemplated
what he was going to do.” 75
When denying the defense’s motion to dismiss the indictment, the
court held that “[t]he Grand Jury could find probable cause that the
defendant’s acts created a grave risk of death to the victim, and indeed,
lead [sic] to his death, similar to starting a fire and walking away from
it.” 76 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed, holding that:
[T]here was probable cause to show that the coercive quality of
the defendant’s verbal conduct overwhelmed whatever willpower
the eighteen year old victim had to cope with his depression, and
that but for the defendant’s admonishments, pressure, and
instructions, the victim would not have gotten back into the truck
and poisoned himself to death. 77

In its decision, the court looked to two previous cases where it upheld
involuntary manslaughter convictions “against a defendant where the
death of the victim is self-inflicted.” 78 In Commonwealth v. Atencio,79
the court upheld an involuntary manslaughter conviction against a
surviving member of a group playing Russian roulette. 80 In Persampieri
v. Commonwealth, 81 the court affirmed the involuntary manslaughter
conviction of a man who, when his wife threatened to commit suicide,
“said she was ‘chicken—and wouldn’t do it.’” 82 He then had his wife get
a .22-caliber rifle from the kitchen, loaded it for her and ensured that
the safety was off, at which point his wife fatally shot herself. 83 In both
cases, however, the defendants were both physically present at the scene
of the suicide and physically assisted with some aspect of the suicide.
moves-trial-date-to-june-5-in-michelle-carter-case [https://perma.cc/8XBLF2PZ] (granting the defense’s motion for a continuance in light of significant
amounts of newly discovered evidence).
75.

Curt Brown, Defense: New Information in Michelle Carter Case Raises
Possible Questions about Timeline, supra note 74.

76.

Memorandum of Decision and Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Indictment, supra note 3, at 5. Similarly, in State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the
issue of causation was critical in the Supreme Court of Minnesota’s strictscrutiny analysis of Minnesota’s assisted-suicide statute. State v. MelchertDinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23–24 (Minn. 2014).

77.

Commonwealth v. Carter, 52 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 (Mass. 2016).

78.

Id. at 1062.

79.

189 N.E.2d 223 (Mass. 1963).

80.

Id. at 224, 226.

81.

175 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1961).

82.

Id. at 389.

83.

Id.
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As previously discussed, Michelle Carter’s connection to Conrad Roy’s
suicide is far more attenuated, with no physical presence at the scene
and no physical assistance, only verbal. Whether Michelle Carter’s actions were actually the proximate cause of Conrad Roy’s suicide is very
much an unanswered question. While the issue of causation is central
to a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, many of the same
problems with other types of prosecutions for encouraging suicide—as
described later in this Note—apply to this type of charge as well. 84
B.

Specific Provisions Criminalizing Encouraging Suicide

Several states specifically criminalize encouraging suicide.85
Generally, states that currently have specific legislation criminalizing
encouraging suicide do so as part of a broader prohibition against
assisted suicide. These statutes tend to share much of their operative
language. Mississippi, for instance, prohibits “advis[ing], encourag[ing],
abet[ting], or assist[ing]” a suicide. 86 Although each of the statutes de-

84.

See infra Part III.B and Part IV (discussing the First Amendment concerns
present in prosecutions for encouraging suicide under specific statutes).

85.

Cal. Penal Code § 401 (West 2010) (“Every person who deliberately aids,
or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide, is guilty of a felony.”);
La. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.12 (2016) (“Criminal assistance to suicide is: (1) The
intentional advising or encouraging of another person to commit suicide or
the providing of the physical means or the knowledge of such means to
another person for the purpose of enabling the other person to commit or
attempt to commit suicide. (2) The intentional advising, encouraging, or
assisting of another person to commit suicide, or the participation in any
physical act which causes, aids, abets, or assists another person in committing or attempting to commit suicide.”); Minn. Stat. § 609.215 (West 2009)
(“Whoever intentionally advises, encourages, or assists another in taking the
other’s own life may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15
years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both.”); Miss.
Code Ann. § 97-3-49 (West 2014) (“A person who willfully, or in any
manner, advises, encourages, abets, or assists another person to take, or in
taking, the latter’s life, or in attempting to take the latter’s life, is guilty of
felony and, on conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the
penitentiary not exceeding ten years . . . .”); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 813
(2011) (“Every person who willfully, in any manner, advises, encourages,
abets, or assists another person in taking his own life, is guilty of aiding
suicide.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-37 (2006) (“Any person who
intentionally in any manner advises, encourages, abets, or assists another
person in taking or in attempting to take his or her own life is guilty of a
Class 6 felony.”); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2141 (1990) (“Whoever
deliberately aids, advises or encourages another to commit suicide, shall be
imprisoned not more than 5 years.”).

86.

§ 97-3-49. For other slight variations on the statutory language, see supra
note 85.
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fines encouraging suicide as a felony, the degrees of punishment somewhat vary. 87 Furthermore, it is clear that, following the logic of the
Supreme Court of Minnesota, these statutes are at least partially unconstitutional.
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, the Supreme Court of Minnesota struck
down in part the Minnesota statute prohibiting “intentionally
advis[ing], encourag[ing], or assist[ing] another in taking the other’s own
life.” 88 The court only struck down the statute as it pertained to
encouraging suicide, and it upheld the portion of the statute prohibiting
assisting suicide. 89 The court based its reasoning on First Amendment
grounds, holding that “the State’s unprotected-speech arguments [were]
unavailing.” 90 The court considered several exceptions to the First
Amendment, holding that none of them applied to the case at hand. 91
The Minnesota Supreme Court first considered whether the statute
“proscribes speech that falls under the ‘speech integral to criminal
conduct’ exception to the First Amendment,” and found that it did
not. 92 In doing so, the court noted that the Minnesota legislature decriminalized suicide in 1911. 93 Although suicide may well be “harmful
conduct that the state opposes as a matter of public policy,” it is not
illegal. 94 Since suicide is not a crime in Minnesota, the court would not
extend the “‘speech integral to criminal conduct’ exception to harmful
conduct.” 95 The court reasoned that this exception is only intended to
cover “speech integral to conduct ‘in violation of a valid criminal
statute,’” and without any criminal statute, the exception could not
apply. 96

87.

See supra note 85 (Minnesota—not more than 15 years in prison;
Mississippi—not more than 10 years in prison; Virgin Islands—not more
than 5 years in prison).

88.

§ 609.215; State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 24 (Minn. 2014).

89.

Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 24.

90.

Id. at 21.

91.

Id. at 19–21.

92.

Id. at 19.

93.

Id.

94.

State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 816 N.W.2d 703, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).

95.

Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 19–20.

96.

Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949)). The court also rejected Minnesota’s argument that the
conduct prohibited by § 609.215 “is an integral part of the criminal conduct
of physically assisting suicide.” The court stated that “the statute, on its face,
does not require a person to physically assist the suicide. In the absence of a
physical-assistance requirement, the analysis proposed by the state is circular
because it effectively upholds the statute on the ground that the speech
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Similarly, the court also found that the statute did not “proscribe[]
speech that falls under the ‘incitement’ exception to the First
Amendment.” 97 The court noted that “[t]he First Amendment only
allows states to forbid advocating for someone else to break the law
when such advocacy is both ‘directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action’ and it is ‘likely to incite or produce such action.’”98
Again, as it did with the speech integral to the criminal conduct exception, the court noted that “the State’s argument fails because suicide is
not unlawful and cannot be considered ‘lawless action.’” 99 Accordingly,
for the same underlying reasons, the court held that the incitement
exception to the First Amendment did not apply under these circumstances. 100
After finding that the statute prohibited speech protected by the
First Amendment, the court found that the prohibitions against advising and encouraging suicide did not survive strict scrutiny. 101 A
“restriction passes ‘strict scrutiny’” when it “(1) is justified by a
compelling government interest and (2) is narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.” 102 In this case, the prohibitions against advising and encouraging suicide did not pass strict scrutiny, as the court found that the
ordinary meanings given to the advising and encouraging provisions
had overly broad interpretations. 103 Furthermore, the court noted that
“nothing in the definitions of ‘advise’ or ‘encourage’ requires a direct,
causal connection to a suicide,” meaning that the statute was not
prohibited by section 609.215 is an integral part of a violation of section
609.215.” Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 20 (emphasis omitted).
97.

Id.

98.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).

99.

Id. at 21.

100. Id. Due to the unique facts of the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court also
considered and rejected Minnesota’s argument that Melchert-Dinkel’s
conduct fell within the fraud exception to the First Amendment. Minnesota
argued that, because Melchert-Dinkel’s conduct involved “the fact that he
lied to his victims” about his identity, it is not protected by the First
Amendment. The court disagreed, stating that while “the government can
restrict speech when false claims are made to ‘gain a material advantage,’”
§ 609.215 prohibits speech beyond just that used to “gain a material
advantage.” Furthermore, there was no evidence that Melchert-Dinkel
gained any sort of material advantage through his speech. As such,
Minnesota’s argument that Melchert-Dinkel’s speech fell under the fraud
exception to the First Amendment was rejected. Id. (quoting United States
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012)).
101. Id. at 23–24.
102. Id. at 21.
103. Id. at 23–24.
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narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest in that
area. 104 The Minnesota Supreme Court held, however, that the
provision of § 609.215 prohibiting assisting suicide passed strict scrutiny
analysis. 105
While State v. Melchert-Dinkel is only binding in Minnesota, its
reasoning is highly persuasive regarding each of the state statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide, as the wording for each statute is quite
similar. 106 Regardless of its precedential value, State v. Melchert-Dinkel
accurately illustrates many of the difficulties with specific legislation
prohibiting encouraging suicide: it is hard to justify these statutes in
the face of the First Amendment and it is difficult for these statutes to
survive strict scrutiny. In addition to the constitutional issues present
in § 609.215, the broad wording of the statute could criminalize far
more conduct than intended. 107 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court
did not strike down the provision of § 609.215 prohibiting assisting
suicide, not all instances of encouraging suicide have facts that would
support a charge of assisting suicide. 108 As discussed in the next Section,
however, some instances of encouraging suicide may also support
charges of aiding or assisting suicide.
C.

Aiding or Assisting the Suicide

In states with statutes prohibiting assisting suicide, 109 prosecutors
may elect to charge defendants with aiding or assisting in the suicide
attempt instead choosing one of the previously mentioned avenues for
prosecuting encouraging suicide. This determination will necessarily be
somewhat dependent on the facts of any given case. In some cases where
a defendant encourages a victim to commit suicide, the facts may also
support a charge of assisting the victim’s suicide if the encouragement

104. Id. at 23.
105. Id. at 21–23. This holding will be discussed in greater detail in Part IV.
106. See supra note 85 (listing states that have specific statutes criminalizing
encouraging suicide).
107. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the difficulties inherent in narrowly tailoring
a statute prohibiting encouraging suicide).
108. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 23–25 (specifying what portions of
Minnesota’s assisted suicide statute survived strict scrutiny). Part IV discusses problems with creating new legislation to prohibit encouraging suicide in more detail.
109. For a list of several states with statutes prohibiting assisting suicide, see
supra note 85; see also Derek Humphry, Assisted Suicide Laws in United
States, Euthanasia Res. & Guidance Org., https://finalexit.org/
assisted_suicide_laws_united_states.html [https://perma.cc/4KY2-8Q95]
(last updated Sept. 7, 2013) for further discussion of these statutes.
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goes beyond general encouragement and becomes specific encouragement constituting actual assistance with the suicide. 110 For instance,
courts in California have held that “[a]lthough on its face the statute
[criminalizing encouraging suicide] may appear to criminalize simply
giving advice or encouragement to a potential suicide, the courts have—
again by analogy to the law of aiding and abetting—required something
more than mere verbal solicitation of another person to commit a
hypothetical act of suicide.” 111 California instead requires “the direct
aiding and abetting of a specific suicidal act . . . ‘contemplat[ing] some
participation in the events leading up to the commission of the final
overt act.’” 112
It is quite likely that a person who offers material assistance specific
to an instance of suicide, such as instructions or advice about how to
commit suicide, could be found guilty of assisting suicide under an
assisted suicide statute. For instance, a jury in Minnesota recently
found the Final Exit Network, a non-profit company advocating for a
right to die, guilty of a felony by aiding in the 2007 suicide of Doreen
Dunn. 113 Members of the Final Exit Network advised Ms. Dunn on how
to commit suicide using helium asphyxiation, were present when she
committed suicide, and removed equipment from the scene afterwards
to make the death appear as if it were a result of natural causes.114
110. See In re Ryan N., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 640–41 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(reversing the conviction of a minor under California’s assisted suicide
statute and remanding to the trial court for a “disposition to reflect a finding
of attempted violation of [the statute],” reasoning that since the suicide in
question was not actually successful, the defendant could only be liable for
the lesser offense of attempting to assist a suicide).
111. Id. at 632.
112. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197–98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting In re Joseph G., 667 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Cal. 1983)) (listing examples
including “furnishing the means for bringing about the death—the gun, the
knife, the poison, or providing the water, for the person who himself commits
the act of self-murder”).
113. Docket, State v. Final Exit Network, No. 19HA-CR-12-1718 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., May 16, 2012) (showing the disposition of the case at the trial court
level as convictions for “Suicide-Aiding,” and “Interference With Dead BodyConcealing Evidence”); see also David Bailey, Minnesota Jury Convicts
Final Exit Group of Assisting 2007 Suicide, Reuters (May 14, 2015, 4:28
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-minnesota-finalexit-idUSKBN
0NZ2AI20150514 [https://perma.cc/KH7R-T9LY] (describing the circumstances surrounding the conviction).
114. See Right-to-Die Group Indicted by Minn. Grand Jury, CBS Minnesota
(May 14, 2012, 7:27 PM), http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/05/14/
right-to-die-group-indicted-by-minn-grand-jury/ [https://perma.cc/VKC5TYCN] (describing how the Final Exit Network assists in suicides); Bailey,
supra note 113 (stating that Doreen Dunn died of helium asphyxiation while
two members of the Final Exit Network were present).
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Although the available facts do not state whether this incident involved
encouraging suicide or not, it stands to reason that a person who provides a similar level of assistance while encouraging someone to commit
suicide could face criminal liability for encouraging and assisting the
suicide.
If Massachusetts had a specific statute prohibiting aiding or
assisting a suicide attempt, prosecutors in Commonwealth v. Carter
may well have chosen to proceed under this sort of theory instead of
under a theory of involuntary manslaughter. 115 Prosecutors could certainly argue that Michelle Carter went beyond mere general encouragement, as she repeatedly badgered her boyfriend into committing
suicide, especially when he expressed hesitation to do so. 116 Carter also
encouraged her boyfriend to look into various types of devices to produce carbon monoxide, and she gave advice about how to set up the
machine. 117 Finally, Carter also spoke with her boyfriend on the phone
immediately before he committed suicide. 118 In a text message to a
friend after her boyfriend’s suicide, Carter stated:
Sam, his death is my fault. Like, honestly I could have stopped
it. I was the one on the phone with him and he got out of the car
because he [sic—it] was working and he got scared and I fucken
told him to get back in, Sam, because I knew he would do it all
over again the next day and I couldn’t have him live that way

115. See Humphry, supra note 109 (“Massachusetts . . . ha[s] no enactments
which criminalize aiding, abetting, assisting or counseling suicide.”).
116. See Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 2, at 12 (“CARTER: You’re so hesitant because you keeping [sic] over
thinking it and keep pushing it off. You just need to do it, Conrad. The more
you push it off, the more it will eat at you. You’re ready and prepared. All
you have to do is turn the generator on and you will be free and happy. No
more pushing it off. No more waiting. CONRAD: You’re right. CARTER:
If you want it as bad as you say you do it’s time to do it today. CONRAD:
Yup. No more waiting. CARTER: Okay. I’m serious. Like you can’t even
wait ‘till tonight. You have to do it when you get back from your walk.”).
117. Id. at 6 (“Yeah, it will work. If you emit 3200 ppm, of it for five or ten minutes
you will die within a half hour. You lose consciousness with no pain. You
just fall asleep and die. You can also just take a hose and run that from the
exhaust pipe to the rear window in your car and seal it with duct tape and
shirts, so it can’t escape. You will die within, like, 20 or 30 minutes all pain
free.”); id. at 8 (“Yes, I think it will work. You say generators produce a lot
of CO, so you just turn it on in your car, take some Benadryls before just in
case and then you’ll breath it in and pass out and die very quickly and
peacefully with no pain at all. There is no way you can fail.”).
118. Id. at 17.
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the way he was living anymore. I couldn’t do it. I wouldn’t let
him. 119

While Carter did not engage in any physical acts of assistance, she did
provide substantial verbal support and advice to her boyfriend that
specifically discussed how to commit suicide when he was hesitant to
continue. 120 It is clear from Michelle Carter’s actions that she encouraged her boyfriend to commit suicide, and there is a colorable argument
that she assisted his suicide as well.
State v. Melchert-Dinkel provides an even clearer example of an
instance where prosecutors can attempt to charge a defendant with
assisting suicide instead of encouraging suicide. While the Minnesota
Supreme Court struck down the statutory provisions prohibiting advising or encouraging another person to commit suicide, the court specifically upheld the provision prohibiting assisting suicide. 121 As a result,
since “[t]he district court . . . made no findings as to whether MelchertDinkel’s actions also constituted assisting the victims in taking their
own lives,” the Minnesota Supreme Court remanded the case for further
proceedings on that issue. 122 In late 2014, Melchert-Dinkel was
convicted of one count of assisting suicide and one count of attempting
to assist a suicide, although the conviction for attempting to assist a
suicide was later reversed on appeal. 123

119. Id. at 21. Carter went on to express regret and state that “it’s all my fault
because I could have stopped him but I fucken didn’t and all I had to say
was I love you and don’t do this one more time and he’d still be here.” Id.
120. Conrad Roy expressed hesitation to commit suicide on multiple occasions.
He once expressed hesitation because he was worried that the carbon
monoxide would kill someone else. In response, Carter told her boyfriend
“You’re over thinking. They will see the generator and realize you breathed
in CO too,” and “You could write on a piece of paper and tape it on saying
carbon monoxide or something if you’re scared.” Id. at 14–15.
121. See supra Part III.B (discussing prosecutions for encouraging suicide under
specific statutory provisions).
122. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Minn. 2014).
123. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No. A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 28, 2015) (“On remand . . . [t]he district court then found
Melchert-Dinkel guilty of assisting Drybrough’s suicide and of the lesserincluded offense of attempting to assist Kajouji’s suicide.”). MelchertDinkel’s conviction for attempting to assist a suicide was reversed on appeal
for insufficient evidence. Id. at *11 (“The state argues that Melchert-Dinkel
attempted to provide Kajouji with what she needed: ‘a confidant, a suicide
partner, strength, knowledge, assistance, and eventually death.’ But assisting
suicide under the statute requires more than ‘providing general comfort or
support’ and more than merely providing information, ‘courage, confidence,
or hope’ . . . . There is therefore no evidence of any substantial step of
assistance.”).
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In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, it is easily arguable that MelchertDinkel went beyond mere passive assistance and general encouragement
to commit suicide. While he did not provide physical assistance to the
victims, he provided specific advice and assistance in the course of encouraging his victims to commit suicide. 124 In one instance, MelchertDinkel provided a victim with information about how to hang himself.125
In another, “Melchert-Dinkel tried repeatedly to dissuade [the victim]
from her plan and convince her instead to hang herself.” 126 While
Melchert-Dinkel provided no physical assistance in the suicides he
encouraged, as he was several countries away, the advice he provided
was specific and tailored directly to how the victims could commit
suicide. 127 Following the second conviction, the Court of Appeals noted
that there was a “direct, causal relationship because Melchert-Dinkel
communicated directly with [the victim] and [the victim] followed
Melchert-Dinkel’s instructions.” 128
Nevertheless, the court glossed over several significant causation
issues. Melchert-Dinkel argued that the victim “had already decided to
commit suicide by hanging before communicating with MelchertDinkel.” 129 The court dismissed the argument, stating that since the
victim followed up by asking a question about other methods for committing suicide, he was “someone who was considering more than one
suicide method, not someone who was fully committed to suicide by
hanging before communicating with Melchert-Dinkel.” 130 Since the victim did not even hang himself in the specific manner suggested by
Melchert-Dinkel, however, the court’s distinction between considering
multiple methods for suicide and being settled on one method is disingenuous. 131 Furthermore, as the victim “also received hanging instructions from another individual,” there does not appear to be a “direct,
causal link[] between speech and the suicide” as stated by the court

124. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 16–17.
125. Id. at 16 (“Melchert-Dinkel described how to commit suicide by hanging by
tying a rope to a doorknob and slinging the rope over the top of the door.”).
126. Id. at 17. The victim did not hang herself, but instead was found in a river
six weeks later with ice skates on. Id.
127. Id. at 16–17. The victims in the charges Melchert-Dinkel faced were from
Ottawa, Canada, and Coventry, England. Id.
128. Melchert-Dinkel, 2015 WL 9437531, at *7 (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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and, more importantly, as required by the statute. 132 Convicting
Melchert-Dinkel for assisting a suicide under the statute appears problematic, as the relationship between his actions and the eventual suicide
appears rather tenuous.
Prosecuting for aiding or assisting a suicide may not be nearly as
attractive to prosecutors as prosecuting for encouraging suicide, however. In some cases, a set of facts that clearly constitutes encouraging
suicide may not clearly establish assisting suicide. A person who encourages another to commit suicide might not take that next step and
give specific advice or material assistance to carry out the act. For instance, if Michelle Carter had not provided specific advice regarding
how her boyfriend should commit suicide, the facts may not have been
present to consider an assisting suicide charge, were one available to
the prosecutors. 133 In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, it is possible that, had
Melchert-Dinkel refrained from offering specific advice on how his
victims should hang themselves, he may not have been convicted for
assisting suicide in his second trial. Furthermore, while Melchert-Dinkel
was initially convicted of two counts of aiding suicide, one of those was
lowered to attempting to assist suicide on remand and was subsequently
vacated on appeal. 134 The prosecutors were unable to charge MelchertDinkel with encouraging the victim to commit suicide, and they had
insufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempting to assist a
suicide, as there was no evidence that Melchert-Dinkel took a
“substantial step of assistance” that was “more than ‘providing general
comfort or support’ and more than merely providing information,
‘courage, confidence, or hope.’” 135 This lack of evidence is a problem
that other similar prosecutions for encouraging suicide may face as well.
D.

Incitement to Commit a Crime

A final potential method for prosecuting someone for encouraging
suicide is under a theory of inciting someone to commit a crime. If
suicide were still a crime in the United States, someone who encouraged
132. Id. (alteration in original). The court held that “causation does not require
Melchert-Dinkel’s assistance to be the sole cause of the suicide.” Id. at *18–
19 (internal quotations omitted).
133. Even if Michelle Carter’s actions had constituted assisting suicide, however,
she may not have been subject to criminal liability in Massachusetts. See
Humphry, supra note 109 (noting that Massachusetts has no assisted-suicide
statute, but that “the United States contends that case law in . . .
Massachusetts . . . indicates that assisting suicide may nevertheless be
prosecuted”).
134. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 17–18 (Minn. 2014); MelchertDinkel, 2015 WL 9437531, at *1, *11.
135. Melchert-Dinkel, 2015 WL 9437531, at *11; see Melchert-Dinkel, 844
N.W.2d at 24 (holding Minnesota’s statute prohibiting encouraging suicide
unconstitutional).
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suicide could potentially be prosecuted, as he or she would be encouraging someone to break the law. 136 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 137 the
Supreme Court held “that the constitutional guarantees of free speech
. . . do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of . . . law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.” 138 Here, prosecutors with an applicable statute—any statute
from Part III.B—could invoke the incitement exception to the First
Amendment so long as they are able to distinguish advocacy and
general encouragement from “incitement to imminent lawless action.”139
The obvious problem, however, is that suicide is no longer a crime
in the United States. Prosecuting someone for encouraging suicide under an incitement theory would require a major expansion of current
constitutional law and, almost certainly, a Supreme Court decision. In
State v. Melchert-Dinkel, for instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
stated that “[i]t is difficult to articulate a rule consistent with the First
Amendment that punishes an individual for ‘inciting’ activity that is
not actually ‘lawless action.’” 140 A zealous prosecutor could potentially
argue that, while no longer a crime, suicide is a “grave public wrong”
that still faces widespread societal condemnation and that the incitement exception should still apply, even though suicide is not, strictly
speaking, lawless action. 141 Such an argument, however, seems unlikely
to succeed. Further, the incitement exception only covers incitement as
it pertains to “imminent lawless action,” not incitement to commit
socially undesirable conduct. 142 With states considering and adopting
assisted suicide legislation, as well as the decriminalization of suicide
and the increased resources and public awareness for the problem of
suicide, it is difficult to effectively argue that suicide is as widely condemned as it once was. 143
Furthermore, even if suicide were still a crime anywhere in the
United States, a prosecutor would still have to prove that the person
136. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that the underlying act
of suicide is no longer illegal in the United States).
137. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
138. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
139. Id. at 448–49.
140. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 20–21. The court also noted “that suicide
is no longer a criminal act in any jurisdiction relevant to this matter.” Id.
141. Historically, “New York considered suicide a ‘grave public wrong’ but not a
crime.” Perr, supra note 18, at 92; see also supra Part I (discussing in greater
detail the historical attitudes towards suicide in Western civilization).
142. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
143. See supra Part I (discussing the modern attitudes towards suicide).
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encouraging suicide was inciting imminent lawless action in order for
the exception to apply. 144 It is not enough for speech to advocate “illegal
action at some indefinite future time,” for it must also “incit[e] or
produc[e] imminent lawless action.” 145 Whether a case involving encouraging suicide includes incitement of imminent lawless action is factdependent and is certainly contestable. As a result, this would certainly
not be a preferable method of prosecution, even if suicide were still
illegal. 146

IV. Problems with Specific Legislation
Criminalizing Encouraging Suicide
As each of the four previously discussed methods for prosecuting
someone for encouraging suicide has its own difficulties and potential
pitfalls, specific legislation to prohibit encouraging suicide appears necessary. 147 Encouraging suicide is a problem that, generally speaking,
society seems to want to address. 148 Victims like Conrad Roy might
144. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
145. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
146. In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, for instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
seemingly expressed skepticism that Melchert-Dinkel’s actions could be
considered inciting imminent unlawful activity. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844
N.W.2d 13, 20–21 (Minn. 2014) (“Even if that were true . . . .”).
147. It is worth noting that the same proximate causation issues discussed in Part
III.A would likely be present for any statute prohibiting encouraging suicide,
as they would with any prosecution for encouraging suicide under any theory
described in this Note. An advantage with prosecuting under a specific
statute criminalizing encouraging suicide, however, is that even if the causation
of the suicide is debatable, a defendant can still be convicted of a lesserincluded offense of attempting to encourage suicide. On remand in State v.
Melchert-Dinkel for one of the remaining counts, “the district court acquitted
Melchert-Dinkel of assisting Kajouji’s suicide because Kajouji did not use
Melchert-Dinkel’s suicide method and convicted him of the lesser-included
offense of attempting to assist her suicide.” State v. Melchert-Dinkel, No.
A15-0073, 2015 WL 9437531, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015). The
court of appeals vacated that conviction for attempting to assist the suicide
due to the Supreme Court of Minnesota’s striking down portions of the
statute at issue. Id. at *10–11.
148. See supra note 12 (discussing the outrage and societal disgust towards
Michelle Carter’s interactions with Conrad Roy); Aaron Rupar, SuicideEncouraging Nurse Melchert-Dinkel is “Very Decent Human Being,” Lawyer
Says, City Pages (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.citypages.com/news/suicideencouraging-nurse-melchert-dinkel-is-very-decent-human-being-lawyer-says6541659 [https://perma.cc/86VV-3WYA] (noting that Melchert-Dinkel’s
lawyer, even while defending his client as “a very decent human being,” had
to admit that “[he wasn’t] arguing that [Melchert-Dinkel’s] actions should be
condoned or that they should be considered anything other than what they
were—unsavory, depraved perhaps”); Online Suicide Advice: Free Speech?,
CBS Minnesota (Oct. 28, 2010, 6:37 AM), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/
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already be suicidal and find themselves turning to the wrong person for
help. 149 Despite the slowly increasing legalization of physician-assisted
suicide, 150 the vast amount of suicide prevention resources indicate that
society still wants to discourage suicide, albeit less vindictively than it
once did. 151
As previously mentioned, a number of states have statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide, but the statutes’ constitutionality is
questionable. 152 Legislation in this area has previously been introduced
at the federal level, but it has not passed. One piece of legislation,
known informally as Suzy’s Law, has been introduced three times but
has never passed. 153 Suzy’s Law was originally proposed in 2007 after a
young college student committed suicide after suffering from depression
and speaking with anonymous people through online message boards.154
Suzy’s Law would not have prohibited encouraging suicide directly.
Instead, it would have prohibited “teach[ing] a particular person how
to commit suicide, knowing that the person so taught is likely to use
that teaching to commit suicide” or “provid[ing] a particular person
with material support or resources to help such person commit suicide,
knowing that the person is likely to use the support to commit
suicide.” 155 Suzy’s Law would punish offenders with a fine or
“imprison[ment] [of] not more than 5 years, or both, but if the death of
any person is caused by the offense, the term of imprisonment that may
be imposed for the offense is any term of years or for life.” 156 Suzy’s Law
2010/10/28/online-suicide-advice-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/3WNQUF84] (noting that “[Melchert-Dinkel] said he stopped after about five years
because he knew it was wrong” and that “Melchert-Dinkel also called his
own actions ‘disgusting’”).
149. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (describing Conrad Roy’s
alleged mental state prior to him meeting Michelle Carter, as well as the
behavior of William Melchert-Dinkel’s victims).
150. See supra note 33 (listing the states that have legalized physician-assisted
suicide, and noting that a number of others are considering legalizing the
practice).
151. See supra note 29 (discussing a small selection of resources available for
suicide prevention).
152. See supra note 85 (listing states that criminalize encouraging suicide).
153. Suzanne Gonzales Suicide Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 940, 110th Cong.
(2007); Suzanne Gonzales Suicide Prevention Act of 2009, H.R. 853, 111th
Cong. (2009); Suzanne Gonzales Suicide Prevention Act of 2011, H.R. 1183,
112th Cong. (2011).
154. C. Jerome Crow, Suicide Leads to Suzy’s Law, Red Bluff Daily News
(Feb. 20, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.redbluffdailynews.com/article/
ZZ/20070220/NEWS/702209780 [https://perma.cc/4AY9-PQGA].
155. H.R. 1183 § 1123.
156. Id.
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never made it out of committee during the three times it was introduced. 157
Current state legislation specifically prohibiting encouraging suicide
appears woefully inadequate in light of State v. Melchert-Dinkel and the
variety of other difficulties facing prosecutions for encouraging suicide. 158 These prosecutions face problems including difficulties in
establishing causation, 159 as well as constitutional problems. 160 Furthermore, any new piece of legislation may face additional problems from a
policy perspective, including an overbroad scope. 161 The remaining sections of the Note seek to illustrate problems that new legislation seeking
to prohibit encouraging suicide will likely run into and potential ways
to address them. These solutions are not intended to be final or
comprehensive but are instead intended as starting points to address
problems that will almost certainly face any such legislation.
A.

Constitutional Problems and Strict Scrutiny

As discussed in Part III.B, since encouraging suicide necessarily involves speech, the First Amendment poses a significant hurdle to creating a statute that prohibits encouraging suicide. No established exception to the First Amendment applies to speech underlying encouraging
suicide. For instance, since suicide is no longer illegal in the United
States—as the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted in State v. MelchertDinkel—encouraging suicide is not “inciting or producing imminent
lawless action.” 162 For the same reason, encouraging suicide does not
fall under the “speech integral to criminal conduct exception.” 163
157. For a more detailed explanation of Suzy’s Law and the circumstances leading
up to Suzanne Gonzales’s suicide, see Mike Gonzales, Suzy’s Law,
http://rce.csuchico.edu/sites/default/files/professional-development/connectlearn-engage/MediasiteMaterials/Suzy's_Law.pdf [https://perma.cc/GR3ZHSYG] (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) (transcript of a talk given by Suzanne
Gonzales’s father, Mike Gonzales, about Suzy’s Law).
158. Many current statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide have similar language
to the statute declared unconstitutional in State v. Melchert-Dinkel. See supra
Part III.B (discussing the difficulties facing prosecutions for encouraging
suicide under existing state statutes criminalizing it).
159. See supra Part III.A (discussing problems with prosecuting encouraging
suicide as involuntary manslaughter).
160. See supra Part III.B and infra Part IV.A (noting the First Amendment
problems with statutes designed to target encouraging suicide).
161. See infra Part IV.B (discussing difficulties with tailoring a statute
criminalizing encouraging suicide narrowly enough to survive strict scrutiny).
162. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see supra Part III.D
(discussing the relationship between encouraging suicide and incitement in
greater detail).
163. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 19–20 (Minn. 2014) (internal
quotations omitted); see Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490,

969

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
Deadly Speech

Since a statute prohibiting encouraging suicide is likely not covered
by an exception to the First Amendment, it must instead pass strict
scrutiny. 164 Under strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction can still
“proscribe protected speech if it can show . . . that the law (1) is justified by a compelling government interest and (2) is narrowly drawn to
serve that interest.” 165 Strict scrutiny is a notoriously difficult standard
for statutes to pass, and although the Supreme Court has attempted to
repudiate the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal
in fact,” the standard remains quite difficult to satisfy, especially in the
context of the First Amendment. 166 It is uncontroversial that preventing
suicide is a compelling government interest. 167 Nevertheless, it is important to note that even though preventing suicide is a compelling government interest, the interest may not remain as compelling in the future.
498 (1949) (“It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an
integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject
the contention now.”).
164. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) (“For the state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, however, regulate
the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.”); Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 21 (“The fact that
the State’s unprotected-speech arguments are unavailing does not end our
inquiry. The government can still proscribe protected speech if it can show
that the restriction passes ‘strict scrutiny’ . . . .”). But see Eugene Volokh,
Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2417 (1996) (arguing that strict scrutiny of contentbased speech restrictions is problematic and produces flawed results, and
proposing several alternatives to strict scrutiny analysis); Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–25
(1991) (“Borrowing the compelling interest and narrow tailoring analysis is
ill advised when all that is at issue is a content-based restriction . . . . This
said, it must be acknowledged that the compelling interest inquiry has found
its way into our First Amendment jurisprudence of late . . . .”).
165. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 21.
166. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (“Strict scrutiny
must not be ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in fact.’”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267 (2007) (discussing the
historical origins of strict scrutiny and the complex practice of applying the
test).
167. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 22 (“[T]he State has a compelling interest
in preserving human life.”); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63
(1973) (discussing the compelling interest the government has in “protecting
the potentiality of human life”).
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With the increase in states considering or even permitting physicianassisted suicide, societal attitudes condemning suicide may be shifting. 168 Given the continuous condemnation of suicide throughout history, however, it is difficult to imagine that preventing suicide is not a
compelling government interest. 169
In order for a statute to pass strict scrutiny, it must also be
narrowly tailored to the compelling government interest. 170 To do so, it
must meet several criteria. 171 First, it must actually advance the
compelling government interest. 172 Second, it must be the least restrictive method of achieving the compelling government interest. 173 This
component is especially important, as it focuses the inquiry on the necessity of the restriction of speech, and not on whether or not the
restriction serves the stated purpose. 174 Furthermore, the statute also
cannot be overinclusive, meaning it prohibits more speech than is necessary to achieve the government’s compelling interest. 175 Although
this seems quite similar to the requirement that the statute must be
the least restrictive means of advancing the compelling government
interest, “the prohibition against overinclusiveness suggests that a statute might be condemned for lack of narrow tailoring even if no less
168. See supra note 33 (listing the states that have enacted physician-assisted
suicide statutes).
169. See supra Part I (discussing the historical attitudes towards suicide in
Western civilization).
170. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d at 21.
171. See Volokh, supra note 164, at 2422–23 (describing four components of the
narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny); Fallon, supra note 166, at 1326–
32 (describing four components courts consider when analyzing whether a
statute is narrowly tailored).
172. Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 226 (1989) (stating
that the government interest at issue, “maintaining a stable political
system,” is certainly compelling, but also that “California . . . never
adequately explains how banning parties from endorsing or opposing primary
candidates advances that interest”).
173. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004) (“The
purpose of the test is not to consider whether the challenged restriction has
some effect in achieving Congress’ goal . . . . The purpose of the test is to
ensure that speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal
. . . .”).
174. Id.
175. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500–01
(1985) (holding that the statute was so overbroad as to constitute a
“wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct”); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 121–22 (1991)
(holding that a New York Son of Sam law, intended to keep criminals from
profiting off of their crimes, “is significantly overinclusive,” and would
encompass too much speech).
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restrictive alternative existed.” 176 Likewise, a statute cannot be underinclusive, restricting significantly less speech than the compelling government interest requires. 177 Underinclusiveness is closely tied to whether the statute actually advances the compelling government interest
and, if present, “diminish[es] the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting speech in the first place.” 178
The narrowly tailored requirement would be the most difficult for
such a statute to meet in seeking to survive strict scrutiny. A significant
problem with any legislation intending to prohibit encouraging suicide
is that it runs a substantial danger of being overinclusive and criminalizing otherwise innocent conduct. Current statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide, such as those discussed in Part III.B, are so broadly
written as to make it unclear what conduct is covered by the legislation.
For instance, the California statute states that “[e]very person who
deliberately aids, or advises, or encourages another to commit suicide,
is guilty of a felony.” 179 Aiding, advising, and encouraging are not defined in the statute and are left somewhat ambiguous, so it is not
initially clear exactly what those terms mean and what conduct is prohibited.
In State v. Melchert-Dinkel, when confronted with a similarly
worded statute that did not define the key terms, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota gave the “statutory terms their common and ordinary
meanings.” 180 After consulting a dictionary, the court determined that
the ordinary meaning of the word “encourage” is to “[g]ive courage,
confidence or hope” and that the ordinary meaning of the word
“advise,” which is also not defined, is to “[i]nform.” 181 The Supreme
Court of Minnesota went on to hold that the portion of the statute that
criminalized advising and encouraging suicide did not survive strict
scrutiny as those “prohibitions [were] not narrowly drawn to serve the
State’s compelling interest in preserving human life.” 182 The court noted
that “a prohibition on advising or encouraging includes speech that is
more tangential to the act of suicide and the State’s compelling interest
176. Fallon, supra note 166, at 1328.
177. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52–53 (1994); Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 780 (2002).
178. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 52.
179. Cal. Penal Code § 401 (West 2010). See supra note 85 (listing jurisdictions
that have statutes prohibiting encouraging suicide).
180. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 23 (Minn. 2014).
181. Id. (alterations in original).
182. Id. at 23–24 (“While the prohibition on assisting covers a range of conduct
and limits only a small amount of speech, the common definitions of ‘advise’
and ‘encourage’ broadly include speech that provides support or rallies
courage.”).
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in preserving life than is speech that ‘assists’ suicide.” 183 The court also
voiced concern that the prohibitions at issue “are broad enough to
permit the State to prosecute general discussions of suicide with specific
individuals or groups.” 184
While it is important to ensure that the full problem of encouraging
suicide is addressed by any new legislation, it is equally important to
ensure that other conduct is not caught up in a statute that is not
intended to address the conduct. A statute prohibiting encouraging suicide that also prohibits otherwise innocent conduct would be problematic at best, and counterproductive and harmful at worst. A family
member attempting to talk someone out of suicide by using “tough
love” with the best of intentions could be prosecuted under a poorly
worded statute. 185 It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a
family member, however misguided, says something that, without context, seems to encourage a loved one to kill himself while intending the
exact opposite effect. A poorly worded statute could also make more
established suicide prevention strategies, such as telephone hotlines,
more difficult to implement. Even if this sort of conduct is not actually
criminalized, it still has the potential to chill speech and discourage
people from engaging in otherwise lawful conduct for fear of being
punished. 186
A poorly worded statute could also criminalize or chill undesirable
activity that, while certainly not desirable, is not meant to be criminalized. For instance, poor wording could outlaw telling someone in
jest to take a long walk off a short pier or even an immature teenager
in a video game telling someone to kill themselves in real life. Bullying
and harassment are certainly undesirable in their own right, and these
can occasionally take the form of telling people to kill themselves. 187 In
one instance, “constant transphobia on the internet” combined with

183. Id.
184. Id. at 24.
185. See Enabling.., Suicide Grief Support Forum, http://suicidegrief.com/
viewtopic.php?f=18&t=2554 [https://perma.cc/S83L-47TE] (last visited Mar.
10, 2016) (providing an example of tough love and the potential reasoning
for why people might choose to use it).
186. See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. Rev. 685 (1978) (discussing
the concept of the chilling effect and the underlying policy considerations
underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area).
187. For examples of how bullying can lead someone to contemplate suicide, see
supra note 45.
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“anonymous trolls goad[ing] [the victim] to kill herself” led to the suicide of a transgender video game developer. 188 One anonymous commenter posted “DO IT, if you’re such a weak willed thin skinned dips—
— then f—— do it.” 189 While this conduct is certainly reprehensible,
and even though society may well have an interest in criminalizing it,
this sort of conduct is best addressed under new or existing bullying
and harassment statutes, as it can often differ significantly from the
instances of encouraging suicide that this Note contemplates. 190
B.

Narrowly Tailoring a Statute Criminalizing Encouraging Suicide

Despite the difficulty inherent in creating a statute prohibiting encouraging suicide, a carefully constructed statute could well survive
strict scrutiny so long as it is narrowly tailored, as discussed earlier.
One way to potentially address an overbroad statute is to explicitly
include a high mens rea, such as knowingly. Under the Model Penal
Code:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an
offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that
nature or that such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware
that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a
result. 191

Alternatively, a statute could include the mens rea of purposely:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an
offense when:

188. Michael E. Miller, ‘Killed Myself. Sorry.’: Transgender Game Developer
Jumps Off Bridge After Online Abuse, Wash. Post (Apr. 28, 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2015/04/28/killed-myself-sorry-transgender-gamedeveloper-jumps-off-bridge-after-online-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/42JA-7W65].
189. Id. While some comments were supportive, others were abusive. One commenter wrote, “[j]umping off a bridge is not rocket science.” Id.
190. But see Pospychala, supra note 45 (showing that bullying can often take the
form of encouraging suicide). See also Emily F. Suski, Beyond the Schoolhouse
Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under
Cyberbullying Laws, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 63 (2014) (discussing problems
with cyberbullying statutes under the First and Fourth Amendments).
191. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (Am. Law Inst., Proposed Official Draft
1985).
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(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that
nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is
aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or
hopes that they exist. 192

A high mens rea would ensure that some of the previously mentioned
examples in Part IV.A would not be covered under the statute, as many
of them, such as “tough love” and online harassment, would likely not
meet the standard for either mens rea.
In addition, some level of interaction between the defendant and
the victim should be required. This level of interaction between the
defendant and the victim should not simply be a minor conversation
between the defendant and the victim, but should instead be some
substantial conversation and interaction about committing suicide
and—as a result of the conversation, whether in whole or in part—the
victim is in imminent danger of committing suicide. Encouraging
suicide generally has some level of interaction between the defendant
and the victim before the victim commits suicide. 193 With this requirement, unsolicited online comments and harassment, while undesirable,
would be excluded from the encouraging suicide statute, as those problems are better addressed with different legislation. Further, requiring
that the conduct at issue results in imminent danger of committing
suicide helps exclude conduct with significant causation issues.
Another way to narrowly tailor the scope of a statute criminalizing
encouraging suicide so as not to be overinclusive would be to require
prosecutors to show that the defendant both subjectively intended for
his conduct to result in a suicide and that, objectively, the victim’s
suicide was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s conduct.
Requiring prosecutors to prove both subjective and objective components would help ensure that otherwise innocent speech would not
be barred. For example, the Supreme Court of California has held that
prosecutions for attempted criminal threats “require proof that the
defendant had a subjective intent to threaten and that the intended
threat under the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable

192. Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
193. State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 16–17 (Minn. 2014) (noting that
communication between the victims and Melchert-Dinkel took the form of
several online conversations); Commonwealth’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, supra note 2 (noting throughout that communication
between the defendant and the victim took the form of extensive text
message conversations and telephone calls).
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person to be in sustained fear.” 194 Furthermore, in Elonis v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that a federal threat statute requires a
jury to be instructed about the defendant’s mental state in addition to
whether “a reasonable person would regard Elonis’s communications as
threats.” 195 Using a subjective and objective component in a statute
criminalizing encouraging suicide would ensure both that a defendant
intended to encourage the victim to commit suicide and that the victim’s suicide was an objectively foreseeable result of the defendant’s
speech. These requirements would help keep the statute narrowly
tailored and inclusive of only the intended conduct.

Conclusion
While it is undoubtedly desirable to prosecute someone for encouraging suicide, such prosecutions, whatever form they may take, face
a number of practical challenges that may prove fatal. Western society
has a long history of condemning and punishing suicide, and it is
certainly something that governments have a compelling interest in
preventing. Although the act itself is no longer punished directly, suicide is still highly discouraged, as evidenced by continuing suicide prevention efforts.
Even though prosecutors currently have several different options
with which to prosecute encouraging suicide—potentially even
successfully—none of these options are ideal, and several have problems
so severe that the options might as well not exist. In addition, the severe
underlying problems with the current methods for prosecuting encouraging suicide may well chill prosecutors from bringing charges for
conduct that realistically should be criminalized. Fortunately, however,
a well-constructed statute criminalizing encouraging suicide might well
survive strict scrutiny analysis. While strict scrutiny is a notoriously
difficult standard, narrowly tailoring such a statute does not appear to
be an impossible task.
Encouraging suicide is only recently receiving increased media
attention, and the legal issues surrounding it will only continue to grow
in number and complexity as the problem is more closely scrutinized.
Furthermore, given the relative novelty of encouraging suicide in the
digital age, it is not clear whether this problem is best addressed by
194. People v. Chandler, 332 P.3d 538, 548–49 (Cal. 2014) (“Accordingly, when
a defendant is charged with attempted criminal threat, the jury must be
instructed that the offense requires not only that the defendant have an
intent to threaten but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.”).
195. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (“Federal criminal
liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without
considering the defendant’s mental state.”).
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specific legislation criminalizing it or instead through alternative means
designed to combat the underlying issues surrounding suicide in a noncriminal manner. As the problem continues to receive media coverage
and grow in prominence, it is important to remember not to adopt a
solution hastily, but instead to address the problem thoughtfully and
deliberately so as to thoroughly address the problem and to avoid the
almost inevitable legal challenges.
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